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This Note argues that the SEC must clarify and modernize its present approach to facilitate
participation by U.S. institutional investors in global offerings. Part I examines the French pri-
vatization program. Part II analyzes the Act’s relevant provisions and the SEC’s no-action letters
addressing the application of these provisions to involvement by U.S. investors in the initial French
offerings. Part III proposes alternatives to the SEC procedures that currently apply to simultaneous
multinational offerings. This Note concludes that the SEC must eliminate unnecessary barriers to
participation by U.S. investors in global securities offerings and adopt a new approach that recog-
nizes and promotes the interests of U.S. institutional investors.
REVISITING MULTINATIONAL SECURITIES
OFFERINGS AFTER THE FRENCH
PRIVATIZATION NO-ACTION LETTERS
INTRODUCTION
The accelerating internationalization of the world's securi-
ties markets' poses a serious challenge to the regulatory
scheme of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC" or "Commission"). Recent multinational stock offer-
ings made by the French Government pursuant to its privatiza-
tion program2 illustrate the uncertainties facing U.S. institu-
tional investors in offshore offerings. Specifically, the stocks
were not registered with the SEC, and both the French Gov-
ernment and U.S. institutional investors were unsure whether
the Securities Act of 19333 (the "Act" or "Securities Act")
would apply to the initial offerings. The SEC issued three no-
action letters4 at the requests of an institutional investor and
the French Government. 5 Although the no-action letters did
clarify the specific issues presented in the requests, they failed
to articulate a method that would facilitate involvement by U.S.
institutional investors in future multinational offerings. Thus,
persistent uncertainties about the Act's application to unregis-
tered global securities offerings still plague potential U.S. insti-
tutional investors.
This Note argues that the SEC must clarify and modernize
its present approach to facilitate participation by U.S. institu-
tional investors in global offerings. Part I examines the French
privatization program. Part II analyzes the Act's relevant pro-
visions and the SEC's no-action letters addressing the applica-
tion of these provisions to involvement by U.S. investors in the
1. United States investors made foreign equities transactions totaling US$45.5
billion in the first half of 1986, almost equaling 1985's total record of US$45.6 bil-
lion. Ketchum, Internationalization of the Securities Markets, in INTERNATIONAL SECURI-
TIES ACTIVITIES OF BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND COMPANIES 6 (E. Greene, R.
Ketchum & L. Quinn chairmen 1987). The 1985 record was, in turn, double the
1982 total. Id. During the same period, U.S. investors were net purchasers of
US$4.2 billion in foreign stocks, already exceeding the 1985 annual record of US$3.9
billion. Id.
2. See infa notes 6-28 and accompanying text.
3. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77r, 77s-77aa (West 1981 & Supp. 1988).
4. See infa note 35.
5. See i!fra notes 86-135 and accompanying text.
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initial French offerings. Part III proposes alternatives to the
SEC procedures that currently apply to simultaneous multina-
tional offerings. This Note concludes that the SEC must elimi-
nate unnecessary barriers to participation by U.S. investors in
global securities offerings and adopt a new approach that rec-
ognizes and promotes the interests of U.S. institutional inves-
tors.
I. THE FRENCH PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM
During the summer of 1986, the French legislature
adopted one of the most ambitious privatization programs of
any Western democracy. 6 Law No. 86-793 of July 2, 1986,
mandates that the state-owned majority interests in sixty-five
companies 7 be transferred from the public to the private sector
by March 1, 1991.8 This legislation not only reverses the wide-
spread nationalizations that took place in 1982, 9 but also ex-
tends to a majority of the assets nationalized immediately after
World War 11.' ° Law No. 86-912" was subsequently passed,
creating the regulatory scheme for implementation of the de-
nationalization program. 12
6. Marquardt, Privatising Finance and Industry in France, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Nov.
1986, at 11. The French boast that the projected US$35 billion of state-owned com-
panies to be sold in a five-year period is four times as much as what Margaret
Thatcher's government has privatized in the United Kingdom in seven years. Revzin,
Selling Capitalism: France Urges Citizenry To Break with Habit, Become Stockholders, Wall St.
J., Nov. 5, 1986, at 1, col. 6.
7. The companies to be privatized include Banque Nationale de Paris, Credit
Lyonnais, and Soci~t6 G6n~rale, France's three largest deposit banks, as well as many
insurance and industrial companies. See Law No. 86-793, July 2, 1986, art. 4 annex,
1986 Journal Officiel de la R~publique Fran~aise [JO.] 8240, 8241, reprinted in France:
Laws Concerning the Privatization of Nationalized Enterprises, 26 I.L.M. 1388, 1394 (1987)
(E. Gaillard trans.) [hereinafter Laws Concerning Privatization].
8. Id. art. 4, 1986 J.O. at 8240, translated in Laws Concerning Privatization, supra
note 7, at 1391; see also Marquardt, supra note 6, at 11 (discussing Law No. 86-793).
9. Marquardt, supra note 6, at 11. On February 11, 1982, the French Legislature
passed Law No. 82-155, Feb. 11, 1982, 1982 J.O. 566, translated in France: Law of
Nationalization, 21 I.L.M. 815 (1982), which provided for "the most sweeping nation-
alisations of any country in the free world since the immediate post-war period."
Marquardt, supra note 6, at 11. The law included the nationalization of major indus-
trial companies, banks, and financial institutions. Laws Concerning Privatization, sipra
note 7, at 1388.
10. Marquardt, supra note 6, at 11.
11. Law No. 86-912, Aug. 6, 1986, arts. 1-22, 1986J.O. 9695, 9695-97, translated
in Laws Concerning Privatization, supra note 7, at 1395-1407.
12. Laws Concerning Privatization, supra note 7, at 1388.
594 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 11:592
Law No. 86-912 authorizes the French Government "to
take diverse measures of a social and economic order"'" in fur-
therance of denationalization. Article 1 includes a list of trans-
actions by which the privatization of enterprises may be accom-
plished.' 4 The law also establishes different methods for priva-
tization depending on whether the majority of an enterprise's
capital is state-owned.' 5 One such method is the so-called pri-
vate placement, 6 through which the securities may be offered
to institutional investors in the United States.' 7 However, the
law imposes a twenty percent ceiling'on purchases by foreign-
ers or by entities under foreign control. 18
Although the details of each offering vary, public offerings
within France are usually made concurrently with an interna-
tional offering.' 9 A public offering in France is conducted pur-
13. Law No. 86-912, Aug. 6, 1986, art. 1, 1986 J.O. at 9695, translated in Laws
Concerning Privatization, supra note 7, at 1395.
14. Id.; Marquardt, supra note 6, at 11. The transactions include
the sale of shares, the exchange of shares for subordinated preferred shares
(titres participatifs) or non-voting common shares (certificats dinvestissement or
certificats pitroliers), the waiver or sale of any preferential right to subscribe to
an increase in capital, an increase in capital through the contribution of
shares or other assets, a merger or split, the issuance of securities, the disso-
lution or liquidation of the enterprise, and the transfer by an issuance com-
pany of its portfolio of policies.
Marquardt, supra note 6, at 11 (discussing Law No. 86-912, art. 1).
15. Law No. 86-912, Aug. 6, 1986, art. 1, 1986 J.O. at 9695, translated in Laws
Concerning Privatization, supra note 7, at 1395.
16. Id., art. 4, 1986 J.O. at 9695, translated in Laws Concerning Privatization, supra
note 7, at 1397. However, the majority of the privatizations will probably occur
through public offerings. Marquardt, supra note 6, at 11-12.
17. See infra notes 86-135 and accompanying text.
18. Law No. 86-912, Aug. 6, 1986, art. 10, 1986J.O. at 9696, translated in Laws
Concerning Privatization, supra note 7, at 1399-1400. Article 10 provides that:
"Whatever the means of transfer the sum total of the shares sold directly or indirectly
by the State to foreign individuals or corporations or those under foreign control....
should not exceed 20% of the capital of the enterprise." Id.
The ceiling was raised to 20% from 15% to allow greater foreign ownership of
the companies to be privatized. Kamm, France Clears a Bill To Sell State Concerns, Wall
St.J., Aug. 1, 1986, at 21, col. 4. The Minister of the Economy may lower this ceiling
if the national interest requires protection. Law No. 86-912, Aug. 6, 1986, art. 10,
1986J.O. at 9696, translated in Laws Concerning Privatization, supra note 7, at 1400. Any
entity possessing holdings in excess of these limits is subject to sanctions, including:
forfeiture of voting rights for the excess shares and an obligation to sell these shares
within three months. Law No. 86-912, Aug. 6, 1986, art. 10, 1986J.O. at 9696, trans-
lated in Laws Concerning Privatization, supra note 7, at 1401; see also Marquardt, supra
note 6, at 12 (discussing Law No. 86-912).
19. College Retirement Equities Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, [1987 Transfer
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suant to an Offre Publique de Vente ("OPV").20 The OPV proce-
dures require that offers and sales of securities in the OPV be
made to all individuals who are French citizens or residents. 2'
In terms of attracting shareholders to the initial offerings,
the privatization program was a resounding success.22 After
the sale of the first ten companies, the number of French peo-
ple owning shares increased from two million to five million, 23
and the offerings were oversubscribed by as much as sixty-five
times the number of available shares.24 In addition, the for-
eign quota, restricted to a twenty-percent ceiling, was enor-
mously oversubscribed for the first two issues.25
This oversubscription of the foreign quota, however, was
achieved with little participation by U.S. investors26 because
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,420, at 77,362 (Feb. 18, 1987) [hereinafter
CREF I].
20. French Privatization Program, SEC No-Action Letter, [1987 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,439, at 77,434 (Apr. 17, 1987) [hereinafter
French Privatization Program].
21. Id. French citizens and residents who want to participate in the OPV are
required to subscribe on forms under categories "A," "B," and "C" as follows:
Category "A" will be available to French and foreign resident individu-
als seeking to purchase that minimum number of shares which will be sold
in equal number and on a priority basis (up to 10) in conformity with Law
No. 86-912.
Category "B" will be available to French and foreign resident individu-
als who have subscribed under Category "A" and who wish, if possible, to
purchase shares additional to those which they may receive under Category
"A".
Category "C" will be available to French entities which are not under
foreign control.
Id. at 77,435; see also SEC Says No Integration in French Privatization Offerings, 19 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 731, 732 (May 15, 1987) (discussing French Privatization Pro-
gram, supra note 20). Through these OPV procedures, the French Government hopes
to achieve two main goals: to quintuple, at the least, the number of individual share
owners, and to spread ownership of State companies so broadly that the companies
can never be renationalized. Revzin, supra note 6, at 1, col. 6.
22. Greenhouse, France Embraces 'Popular Capitalism', N.Y. Times,June 8, 1987, at
D10, col. 1.
23. Id.
24. Id. In fact, many shareholders complained that they could not purchase as
many shares as they wanted. As a result, many subscribers requested more shares
than they expected to receive in the hope of acquiring approximately the number
they had originally wanted. Id. at cols. 2-3.
25. Privates on Parade, EUROMONEY FRANCE, June 1987 Supp., at 11. The first two
issues were Compagnie de Saint-Gobain and Compagnie Financi~re de Paribas. Id.
26. Americans bought less than one percent of the first two offerings. French
Courting American Investment, Proprietary to the U.P.I., Apr. 20, 1987 (LEXIS, NEXIS
library, UPI file) [hereinafter French Courting].
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the concurrent international offering did not meet SEC re-
quirements. Specifically, the international offering was not
registered under the Securities Act. 27 Consequently, under-
writers of the offering stressed that the shares were not being
offered in the United States and that they were not seeking
U.S. investors.28
II. SEC REGULATIONS AND OFFSHORE OFFERINGS
French issuers were disappointed with U.S. investment in
their first two stock offerings, and they blamed complicated
SEC rules for the minimal U.S. participation.29 The Securities
Act of 1933 requires registration of securities with the SEC
prior to their offer or sale in the United States unless an ex-
emption from registration is available.3 ' However, French is-
suers were concerned that they would unintentionally violate
these SEC regulations because of the lack of clarity in U.S. law
regarding U.S. investment in foreign equities." Moreover, the
twenty-percent ceiling on foreign investment made registra-
tion more trouble than it was worth for most of the French
companies. 2 Thus, both U.S. institutional investors, who
wanted to participate in the initial offering through the U.S.
private placement,33 and the French Government, which wel-
comed U.S. participation, were forced into a complex analysis
of the applicable SEC regulations and the available exemp-
tions.3 4 Ultimately, a potential institutional investor and the
French Government sought no-action letters from the SEC '
27. See infra note 37.
28. Browning, France Today Begins Sale of State Firms with an Offering of 60ro of Saint
Gobain, Wall St.J., Nov. 24, 1986, at 34, col. 2, col. 3; see also Marquardt, supra note 6,
at 13 ("the application of U.S. regulatory requirements ... often has a chilling effect
on the foreign issuer's desire to gain access to [the U.S. capital] markets").
29. French Courting, supra note 26. The French complained that only a few
"sophisticted institutional investors were able to make a limited number of non-solic-
ited bids. Procedural restraints tended to limit the number of shares available to
American investors." Id.
30. Securities Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982).
31. French Courting, supra note 26.
32. Id.
33. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 86-135 and accompanying text.
35. In a no-action letter, an authorized SEC official indicates that the SEC staff
will not recommend any enforcement action to the Commission if the proposed
transaction described in the correspondence is consummated. Procedures Utilized
by the Division of Corporation Finance for Rendering Informal Advice, SEC Securi-
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to confirm that the prospective U.S. private placements would
fall within an exemption from the Act.
A. Exemptions From Registration and Integration of Offerings
1. Section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933
Section 4 of the Act3 6 lists transactions that are exempt
from the registration requirements of section 5.37 Under sec-
tion 4(2), "transactions by an issuer not involving any public
offering" are exempt.3 8 The legislative history of section 4(2)
indicates an intent to exempt transactions "where there is no
practical need for [the Act's] application or where the public
benefits are too remote." 3 9
Although the Act does not define the phrase "public offer-
ing," the SEC and U.S. courts have decided that whether a
transaction involves a public offering is a question of fact that
necessitates consideration of all the surrounding circum-
stances. 40  In a leading case, SEC v. Ralston Purina Co. ,41 the
Supreme Court held that the section 4(2) exemption must be
viewed in light of the statutory purpose to "protect investors
by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary
to informed investment decisions, "42 and that its applicability
ties Act Release No. 33-6253, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,644, 72,644 n.2 (Nov. 3, 1980). Some-
times the staff will respond to a no-action request by saying that it cannot provide
such assurances. Id. The public can rely on no-action letters as representing the
Division's views. Id. at 72,644 n.4. However, the letters represent staff positions only
and do not constitute an official expression of the SEC's views. Id. See generally
Lemke, The SEC No-Action Letter Process, 42 Bus. LAw. 1019 (1987).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1982).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982). Section 5 of the Act forbids the use of any means of
interstate commerce or of the mails to sell or offer to sell securities without having
first filed a registration statement with the SEC. Id.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2). This exemption is often referred to as the private ofler-
ing or private placement exemption; see supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
39. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933); see also Integration of Securities
Offerings: Report of the Task Force on Integration, 41 Bus. LAW. 595, 603 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter Integration of Securities Offerings] (discussing integration of exempt transactions).
Traditionally, § 4(2) has been interpreted as "providing an exemption from registra-
tion, available only to the issuer of the securities, for bank loans, private placement of secur-
ities with institutions, and the promotion of a business venture by a few closely re-
lated persons." R. HAFr, ANALYSIS OF KEY SEC No-ACTION LETrERS, 1987-88 EDI-
TION § 3.01, at 3-1 (1987) (emphasis in original).
40. See cases cited infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
41. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
42. Id. at 124.
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"should turn on whether the particular class of persons af-
fected needs the protection of the Act.""
In accordance with the reasoning in Ralston Purina, courts
have developed flexible tests under section 4(2). 4 4  These
courts have focused on a variety of factors, including: (1) the
number of offerees;45 (2) the sophistication of the offerees;4 6
(3) the size and manner of the offering; 47 and (4) the relation-
ship of the offerees to the issuer.48 U.S. institutional investors
like those wishing to participate in the initial offerings of the
French privatization program are routinely regarded as sophis-
ticated investors under section 4(2) of the Act. 49 Thus, it
seems clear that the section 4(2) exemption applies to the U.S.
private placement of the French offerings, thereby insulating
the French issuer, participating underwriters, and the French
Government from exposure to civil or criminal liability under
U.S. law for failure to register the offerings.5 °
2. Exemptions Under Regulation D of the Act
To ease the burden of meeting the requirements for avail-
able exemptions, principally private placements and limited of-
ferings, the SEC adopted a series of six rules to provide certain
issuers with additional limited-offering exemptions from the
Act's registration and prospectus-delivery requirements. 1
43. Id. at 125.
44. See, e.g., Mary S. Krech Trust v. Lakes Apartments, 642 F.2d 98 (5th Cir.),
rehg denied, 645 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1981); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 644 (9th Cir.
1980); General Life of Mo. Inv. Co. v. Shamburger, 546 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1976).
45. See, e.g., Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 900 (5th Cir.
1977); SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co. of S.C., 463 F.2d 137, 158 (5th Cir. 1972);
Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 687 (5th Cir. 1971).
46. See, e.g., Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 691 (Ist Cir. 1978); Doran, 545
F.2d at 902; Hill York Corp., 448 F.2d at 690.
47. See, e.g., Doran, 545 F.2d at 900; Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d at 158; Hill
York Corp., 448 F.2d at 689.
48. See, e.g., Cook, 573 F.2d at 691; Doran, 545 F.2d at 902; Continental Tobacco
Co., 463 F.2d at 158; Hill Y ork Corp., 448 F.2d at 687.
49. Institutional investors are routinely regarded as sophisticated investors
under section 4(2) of the Act because they have access to all the information that a
registration statement would have provided. See cases cited supra note 46.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 141-45.
51. Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involv-
ing Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389, [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder! Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,106 (Mar. 8, 1982) [hereinafter Release 6389].
These rules were "designed to simplify and clarify existing exemptions, to expand
their availability, and to achieve uniformity between federal and state exemptions in
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These rules,52  designated "Regulation D, ' 53  fall into two
groups: (1) Rules 501, 502, and 503 define common terms,
provide general conditions for the exemptive rules, and estab-
lish a uniform notice-of-sales form, Form D, for use with ex-
empted offerings under Regulation D and section 4(6) of the
Act; (2) Rules 504, 505, and 506 replace exemptions previ-
ously available under Rules 240, 54 242, 55 and 146,56 respec-
tively.57
Rule 501(a) incorporates the institutional investors listed
in section 2(15)(i) of the Act into Regulation D as accredited
investors .5  Rules 505 and 506 permit a maximum number of
thirty-five purchasers; 59 however, accredited investors are not
order to facilitate capital formation consistent with the protection of investors." Id.
at 84,907. The Rules became effective on April 15, 1982. Id. Regulation D was pro-
posed in SEC Securities Act Release No. 6339, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 83,014 (Aug. 7, 1981).
52. Rules 501-506, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-506 (1987).
53. The official title is "Regulation D-Rules Governing the Limited Offer and
Sale of Securities Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933."
54. 17 C.F.R. § 230.240 (1982), removed by Revision of Certain Exemptions from
Registration for Transactions Involving I imited Offers and Sales, SEC Securities Act
Release No. 33-6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,262 (Mar. 8, 1982).
55. 17 C.F.R. § 230.242 (1982), removed by SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-
6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,262.
56. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1982), removed by SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-
6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,261.
57. See generally J. HICKS, LIMITED OFFERING EXEMPrIONS: REGULATION D
§§ 1.01-.06 (1987); Knipprath, Regulation D: Rationalizing The Exemptions Under The
1933 Securities Act, 7 GLENDALE L. REV. 97 (1987).
58. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a). Section 2(15) of the Securities Act reads:
(15) The term "accredited investor" shall mean-
(i) a bank as defined in section 3(a)(2) of the Act whether acting in
its individual or fiduciary capacity; an insurance company as defined in
section 2(13) of the Act; an investment company registered under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 or a business development company
as defined in section 2(a)(48) of that Act; a Small Business Investment
Company licensed by the Small Business Administration; or an em-
ployee benefit plan, including an individual retirement account, which
is subject to provisions of the Employee Retirement Security Act of
1974, if the investment decision is made by a plan fiduciary, as defined
in section 3(2 1) of such Act, which is either a bank, insurance company,
or registered investment advisor; or
(ii) any person who, on the basis of such factors as financial sophis-
tication, net worth, knowledge, and experience in financial matters, or
amount of assets under management qualifies as an accredited investor
under rules and regulations which the Commission shall prescribe.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(15) (1982).
59. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505(b)(2)(ii), 230.506(a)(2).
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counted toward the thirty-five. 6° Thus, an issuer hoping to
rely on either exemption may find it essential that a purchaser
qualify as an "accredited investor." Accordingly, the Regula-
tion D exemptions are available if the French private place-
ments to U.S. institutional investors6' comply with the general
requirements of Rules 504, 505, and 506.62
3. Integration and SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4708
Shortly after the adoption of the Act, the SEC embraced
the "integration" concept 63 to protect investors from issuers
who sought to circumvent the Act's registration provisions by
dividing one non-exempt offering into two or more exempt of-
ferings.64 Essentially, the SEC uses integration to combine two
or more separately structured and otherwise exempt securities
offerings into a single offering that does not qualify for exemp-
tion from registration under the Act.65 This procedure results
in one unregistered illegal offering. 66 The SEC promulgated a
five-factor test in its basic release on integration 67 that has
been subsequently applied in securities proceedings.68
60. Id. § 230.501(e)(1)(iv).
61. Foreign issuers may use Regulation D pursuant to amendments that clarified
the disclosure requirements applying to such issuers. Adoption of Foreign Issuer
Integrated Disclosure System, SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-6437, 47 Fed. Reg.
54,764, 54,764 (Dec. 6, 1982).
62. For detailed discussions of these rules and the requirements thereunder see
R. HAFT, supra note 37, §§ 3.01-12. See generallyJ. HICKs, supra note 57; Knipprath,
supra note 57.
63. See Extracts from Letters of Federal Trade Commission Relating to Applica-
tions of Various Sections of the Act, SEC Securities Act Release No. 97, 11 Fed. Reg.
10,949 (Dec. 28, 1933).
64. Integration of Securities Offerings, supra note 37, at 599.
65. Id. at 595.
66. Id.
67. Non-Public Offering Exemption, SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4552,
27 Fed. Reg. 11,316 (Nov. 6, 1962). The five-factor test is as follows:
(1) Are the offerings part of a single plan of financing?
(2) Do the offerings involve issuance of the same class of security?
(3) Are the offerings made at or about the same time?
(4) Is the same type of consideration to be received?
(5) Are the offerings made for the same general purpose?
Id. at 11,317; see also Integration of Securities Offerings, supra note 37, at 610-23 (discuss-
ing five-factor test).
68. See, e.g., SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980) (court applied SEC's
five-factor test to find sale of limited partnership interests in 30 separate partnerships
was single offering); LaserFax, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1985-1986 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1I 78,137 (Aug. 15, 1985) (SEC used five-factor test
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The concept of integration arises in the context of the
French privatization program because, in most cases, there is a
public offering within France and a concurrent international
offering, neither of which is registered under the Act. 69 There-
fore, an exemption from registration under either section 4(2)
or Regulation D is lost if the private offering in the United
States is integrated with the concurrent public offering in
France.
The applicable SEC policy regarding integration of off-
shore offerings with concurrent domestic offerings is enunci-
ated in Release No. 33-4708 ("Release 4708").7o In Release
4708 the SEC asserts that "the registration requirements of
section 5 of the Act are primarily intended to protect American
investors. ' 1 Release 4708 provides that registration under
the Act is not required if the distribution of the securities is
effected in a way that results in the securities coming to rest
abroad and if the offering is made under circumstances reason-
ably designed to preclude the distribution or redistribution of
the securities to U.S. nationals.72 In addition, because the Act
does not apply to an offering of securities distributed abroad
to foreign nationals, Release 4708 further provides that such
offerings need not be integrated with offerings made concur-
rently with a U.S. private offering, if the latter otherwise meets
the standards for a private offering under section 4(2) of the
Act. 73
Although Rules 504 and 505 are not promulgated under
to determine proposed sale of convertible debentures under Regulation D would be
integrated with prior Regulation D offering). See generally R. HAFT, supra note 37,
§§ 6.01-.09.
69. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
70. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4708, 29 Fed. Reg. 9828 (July 9, 1964)
[hereinafter Release 4708]. The SEC promulgated this Release pursuant to a presi-
dential task force's recommendations that the Commission publish its position on the
applicability of the Act's registration provisions to securities offered by domestic issu-
ers to foreign investors. Id. See generaly Integration of Securities Offerings, supra note 37,
at 638-41; Haseltine, Uniited States Tax and Securities Laws: lWorking "Together" Toward
Different Goals in Eurobond Financings, II MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 221, 226-29 (1987).
71. Release 4708, supra note 70. Therefore, the SEC takes no remedial action
for failure to register securities that originate in the United States and are later dis-
tributed abroad to foreign nationals. Id.
72. Id. (emphasis added).
73. Id.; see also supra notes, 36-50 and accompanying text (discussing § 4(2) ex-
emption).
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section 4(2)," the SEC's rationale for integrating simultaneous
multinational offerings under Release 4708 applies equally to
offerings under Rules 504 and 505. 7 5 However, when Regula-
tion D was adopted it contained no express provisions for inte-
grating concurrent domestic and foreign offerings. 76 The SEC
corrected this omission in 1982 by adding preliminary note 7,
which states: "Offers and sales of securities to foreign persons
made outside the United States effected in a manner that will
result in the securities coming to rest abroad generally need not
be registered under the Act." 7 7 In addition, the note to Rule
502(a) was similarly amended to address whether transactions
exempt under Regulation D would be integrated with simulta-
neous foreign offerings.78 The note, as amended, provides
that "[g]enerally, transactions otherwise meeting the require-
ments of an exemption will not be integrated with simultane-
ous offerings being made outside the United States effected in
a manner that will result in the securities coming to rest abroad."79
Thus, Release 4708 provides the framework for integra-
tion by mandating that otherwise exempt foreign offerings in
the United States will be integrated unless the offers or sales of
the securities are effected so that the securities come to rest
abroad, that is, will not flow back into the hands of U.S. inves-
tors. During the more than twenty years since the SEC
promulgated Release 4708, the SEC's Division of Corporate
74. The statutory source of Rules 504 and 505, which limit the size of offerings
to US$500,000 and US$5 million, respectively, is § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1982).
75. Integration of Securities Offerings, supra note 37, at 639.
76. Release 6389, supra note 51, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,106, at 84,910-11.
77. 17 C.F.R. pt. 230 reg. D. preliminary note 7, at 425, as amended at 47 Fed.
Reg. 54,771 (1982) (emphasis added). The note continues, stating that:
This interpretation may be relied on for such offers and sales even if coinci-
dent offers and sales are made under Regulation D inside the United States.
Thus, for example, persons who are not citizens or residents of the United
States would not be counted in the calculation of the number of purchasers.
Similarly, proceeds from the sales to foreign purchasers would not be in-
cluded in the aggregate offering price. The provisions of this note, how-
ever, do not apply if the issuer elects to rely solely on Regulation D for
offers or sales to foreign persons.
Id.
78. Adoption of Foreign Issuer Integrated Disclosure System, SEC Securities
Act Release No. 33-6437, 47 Fed. Reg. 54,764, at 54,771 (1982); see 17 C.F.R.
§ 502(a) note (1987).
79. 17 C.F.R. § 502(a) note (emphasis added).
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Finance ("Division"). has emphasized that the crucial factor in
integrating is whether the distribution of the securities is "rea-
sonably designed to preclude distribution or redistribution of
the securities within or to nationals of, the United States."-
8 0
Accordingly, to avoid integration of concurrent foreign and
domestic offerings, the issuer must take precautions8 ' to en-
sure that the securities will come to rest abroad.8 2
Release 4708 has been implemented and interpreted ex-
clusively through no-action letters,83 thereby causing great un-
certainty about the application of Release 4708 to situations
not previously addressed by the Division. In particular, the of-
ferings made by the French Government in its privatization
program raised questions about the legal consequences in the
United States of privately placing the securities with U.S. inves-
tors. This uncertainty arose because of the absence, in the
French placements, of any precautionary measures 84 that are
commonly used in Eurobond offerings to comply with the
mandate of Release 4708, which is to prevent the distribution
or redistribution of the securities in the United States or to
U.S. nationals.8 5
80. R. HAFT, supra note 37, § 2.03; see Integration of Securities Offerings, supra note
37, at 638-41.
81. The SEC has taken no-action positions when foreign offerings used some or
all of the following anti-flowback provisions: (1) no sales may be made to American
nationals, which includes both American citizens and resident aliens, see CREF I, supra
note 19, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,420, at 77,362; (2)
each foreign investor must represent that he is purchasing the securities for his own
account and not for the account of an American national, see French Privatization Pro-
gram, supra note 20, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,439, at
77,435; (3) the underwriters and investors must represent that they will not resell the
securities in the United States or to U.S. residents, see CREF I, supra note 19, [1987
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,420, at 77,362-63. Integration of Securi-
ties Offerings, supra note 37, at 640.
82. The SEC apparently adopts the argument that, under Release 4708, offer-
ings tofforeign natioinals abroad are beyond the intended scope of the Act and should
therefore have no effect upon otherwise available exemptions from registration. See
Integratiot of Securities Offerings, supra note 37, at 640 (citing Scientific Mfg., Inc., SEC
No-Action Letter, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,505, at
78,625-26 (May 12, 1983)).
83. R. HAFr, supra note 37, § 2.03; see snpra note 35.
84. See supra note 81.
85. Release 4708, supra note 70.
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B. The No-Action Letters
The SEC has responded to three no-action requests ad-
dressing the application of the Securities Act of 1933 to poten-
tial U.S. investment in the initial French privatization offerings.
The French Government was the initiator of one such request,
while the other two were initiated by a U.S. institutional inves-
tor, the College Retirement Equities Fund ("CREF"). 6
1. The CREF I Letter
The Division issued the first no-action letter in response
to CREF's request, which asked the SEC to concur in CREF's
view that it could participate in the U.S. private placements of
the French privatization offerings without registration of the
securities under the Act.87 CREF asserted that a major portion
of its long-term investment strategy-purchasing the securities
of French issuers-could not be pursued if it remained unable
to participate in the French privatization offerings.88 Further-
more, CREF claimed that the uncertainties surrounding the
Act's application to the French privatization offerings placed it
at an unnecessary disadvantage in relation to non-U.S. institu-
tions worldwide, which were able to participate in the offerings
at the initial price.8 9 Finally, CREF stressed that the Act was
86. CREF is a New York corporation that forms the variable annuity arm of the
Teachers Insurance Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund, a pen-
sion system for U.S. teachers. Quickel, U.S. Investors: Caution or Mulish Obstinacy?,
EUROMONEY, Oct. 1986, at 23. CREF's management of a commingled Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act fund of approximately US$28 billion involves over
US$3 billion invested in foreign equities abroad. Id. CREF has engaged in global
investing since 1978 and, as of February 1987, held securities of French issuers worth
over US$160 million. CREFI, supra note 19, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec L. Rep.
(CCH) 78,420, at 77,361; see also SEC Staff Clears Pathfor Institutions Investing in Priva-
tization Offerings, 19 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 283 (Feb. 27, 1987) (discussing CREF
1, supra note 19). CREF is easily the largest U.S. investor in foreign markets.
Quickel, supra, at 23. See generally Davis, $60 Billion in the Balance, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27,
1988, § 6 (Magazine), pt. 2, at 17.
87. CREF 1, supra note 19, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
78,420, at 77,362. CREF was forced to submit a no-action request to the SEC after
an unsuccessful attempt to convince the French Government that CREF's participa-
tion in the initial offerings would not expose French issuers to liability tnder the Act.
Stamas, SEC Issues Major Intepretive Letter For U.S. Firms hIvesting Abroad, SEC. WEEK,
Feb. 23, 1987, at 1; see infra text accompanying notes 141-45.
88. CREF I, supra note 19, 11987 Transfer Binderl Fed. Sec L. Rep. (CCH)
78,420, at 77,362.
89. Id.
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"not intended to have this sort of prejudicial effect on U.S. in-
stitutional investors."9 Accordingly, CREF suggested that its
participation in the privatization offerings would not expose
the French issuer, participating underwriters, or the French
Government to liability for failure to register the offerings if
certain conditions were met.9
CREF's brief analysis of the U.S. legal issues was based on
the premise that the Act clearly would not apply and that pre-
cautionary measures 92 would not be required if the offerings
were made only outside the United States and only to non-U.S.
nationals.9" CREF expanded this premise by asserting that its
90. Id.
91. Id. The conditions, which apply to each concurrent domestic private offer-
ing and foreign public offering, are as follows:
1. At the time of the Offerings there exists no active public market in
the United States for the securities being offered or for other securities of
the issuer;
2. CREF and other U.S. institutional investors participating in the Pri-
vate Offering each represents and warrants (a) that it is purchasing such
securities for investment and not with a view to distribution in the United
States or to U.S. nationals and (b) that it will not resell such securities within
the United States or knowingly to any U.S. national, except in each case
pursuant to an effective registration statement or in a transaction not requir-
ing registration under the 1933 Act, it being understood that any such insti-
tutional investor may sell securities purchased in the Private Offering on the
Paris Bourse in regular way transactions without investigation as to the na-
tionality of the counterparty;
3. The character of the offerees and the other circumstances of the
Private Offering meet the requirements for a valid private placement of se-
curities exempt under section 4 of the 1933 Act;
4. The documents for the Offerings state that such securities are not
being offered within or to nationals of the United States (other than to insti-
tutional investors in transactions exempt from registration under the 1933
Act), the underwriters, dealers and other distributors of such securities par-
ticipating in such offerings agree with the issuer and the French government
that such securities may not be sold by them within or to nationals of the
United States other than pursuant to an effective registration statement or in
a transaction not requiring registration under the 1933 Act; and
5. No other precautionary measures to prevent distribution or redis-
tribution within the United States or to U.S. nationals of securities sold in
the Offerings are imposed.
d. at 77,362-63; see also Chubb & Kelly, SEC No-Action Letter Relaxes the Market, INT'L
FIN. L. REv., Apr. 1987, at 21, 21-22 (discussing CREF I, supra note 19); SEC Staff
Clears Wav For Investigating Privatization Offerings, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No.
42, at A-30 (Mar. 5, 1987) (discussing CREF I, supra note 19).
92. See supra note 81.
93. CREF I, supra note 19, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec L. Rep. (CCH)
78,420, at 77,363.
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participation in the private offering under such conditions
would not trigger application of the Act because the
probability of the securities reaching the United States or the
possession of U.S. nationals would not be greater than if the
offering completely excluded all U.S. persons.9 4 CREF stated
that the policy underlying the Act's registration requirement
was "the protection of financially unsophisticated investors at
the retail level within the U.S. capital markets." 95 Thus, CREF
argued that, because it is a sophisticated investor, this underly-
ing policy is achieved without mandating registration of the
private offerings or attaching precautionary measures to the
public offerings simply because the two offerings occur simul-
taneously.96
Finally, CREF sought the Division's affirmance that resale
of the securities on the Paris Bourse ("Bourse") without first
investigating the nationality or residence of the purchaser
would not trigger the Act's application.97 As support, CREF
noted that the amount of procedural precautions necessary to
satisfy the requirements of Release 4708 increases as the possi-
bility that such securities will come to rest abroad decreases.9"
CREF urged the Division to recognize that the possibility of
securities flowing back into U.S. markets was substantially de-
creased because the privatization offerings involve French
rather than U.S. issuers, and because there is no active public
market for the securities in the United States. 9 Therefore,
CREF asserted that the requirements of Release 4708 would
be satisfied "without the full panoply of procedures currently
applied in eurodollar offerings by U.S. issuers,"' 00 if certain
provisions were met.'0 ' The provisions were that all distribu-
tors of such securities were contractually barred from distrib-
uting or redistributing the securities within or to nationals of
the United States and that these limitations were clearly dis-
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The Division agreed with all of CREF's opinions.'0° First,
the Division stated that the foreign public offerings would not
be integrated with and would not affect the availability of
either the section 4(2) exemption or Regulation D exemption
for offerings in the United States. 0 4 Next, the Division agreed
that if the conditions of the offering were met, 10 5 additional
precautionary measures in the foreign offerings would not be
necessary simply because of the simultaneous U.S. private
placements.' 0 6 Finally, the Division responded that CREF's
ability to resell the securities in so-called regular-way transac-
tions on the Bourse without investigating the nationality or
residence of the counterparty would not affect these conclu-
sions.' 0 7
2. The French Privatization Program Letter
Although the SEC viewed CREF I as a landmark interpre-
tation of Release 4708,108 subsequent no-action requests ex-
posed the need for further clarification of the Act's impact on
multinational offerings. Despite CREF I, the French Govern-
ment remained unsure about the application of the Act's reg-
istration requirements to its privatization offerings within
France.' 0 9 This uncertainty arose because Law No. 86-912 re-
quired the French Government to sell the securities in the pub-
lic offering within France to all French residents, including
U.S. citizens residing in France.' t0 Prior to the Division's issu-
ance of the French Privatization Program letter, the SEC limited




105. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
106. CREF I, supra note 19, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec L. Rep. (CCH)
78,420, at 77,363.
107. Id. Although neither CREF's request nor the Division's response ad-
dressed the question of when the securities could be resold on the Paris Bourse, it is
implicit in the Division's response that such resales may occur immediately. Chubb &
Kelly, supra note 91, at 23.
108. See SEC Asked to Clarify Parts of Letter to CREF on Foreign Private Offerings, SEC.
WEEK, Apr. 13, 1987, at 3 [hereinafter SEC Asked to Clarify].
109. See SEC Issues No-Action Letter to French Gov 't on Sales to U.S. Firns Abroad, SEC.
WEEK, May 4, 1987, at 4 [hereinafter SEC Issues No-Action Letter to French Gov't].
110. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
I 11. SEC Issues NVo-Action Letter to French Gov't, supra note 109, at 4.
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In its no-action request the French Government empha-
sized the absence, at the time of the privatization, of an active
public market in the United States for the securities of the
privatized companies." 12 The request also stated that while the
international privatization offerings would "employ traditional
Euro-market anti-integration measures,"' 1 3 the U.S. private
placements would be conducted substituting OPV procedures
for such measures.1 I 4 The OPV procedures would, in effect,
preclude offers and sales of the securities to U.S. persons other
than U.S. individuals residing in France. 1 5 The French Gov-
ernment thus expected the OPV procedures to be more effec-
tive in precluding such sales than the traditional Euromarket
measures. 1 6  Furthermore, the French Government noted
that, because the OPV is not directed at U.S. persons, it would
be "appropriate as a matter of comity and otherwise that the
rights of U.S. citizens resident in France be governed by
French legal requirements [i.e., Law No. 86-912] rather than by
112. French Privatization Program, supra note 20, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 78,439, at 77,434.
113. Id. at 77,435. The traditional Euromarket anti-integration measures in-
clude:
(a) disclosure that the securities have not and will not be registered
under the '33 Act and may not be offered or sold in the United States or to
or for the account of U.S. persons, (b) agreements by underwriters and sub-
underwriters not to offer or sell any of the securities acquired in the distri-
bution in the United States or to or for the account of any U.S. person and
(c) in connection with sales of the securities to dealers, customary written
notices delivered to such dealers of the U.S. selling restrictions, which no-
tice will contain deemed representations and agreements from such dealers
relating to the selling restrictions and will require such dealers to deliver a
similar notice to any dealer to whom they sell these securities.
Id.
114. Id. The no-action letter states the OPV procedures as follows:
Each investor will sign a non-distribution letter which will confirm that
the purchase is made for the investor's own account or for accounts as to
which it exercises sole investment discretion. Each investor will agree not to
make any reoffers or resales of the securities unless such offer and sale (a)
are pursuant to an exemption from the registration requirements of the '33
Act, (b) are made in a transaction to which the registration requirements of
the '33 Act would not apply or (c) are made on the Paris Bourse in regular
way transactions without any requirement to make an investigation as to the




1988] MULTINATIONAL SECURITIES OFFERINGS
.an extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws."" 7  Fi-
nally, the request asked for the Division's concurrence in the
opinion that, first, the French and international public offer-
ings would not be integrated with, and would not affect the
availability of the Act's exemptions for, the U.S. private place-
ments, and, second, that the concurrent U.S. private place-
ments would not necessitate the use of additional procedures
in the foreign offerings. 18
The Division concurred with both parts of the French
Government's final opinion." 9 In addition, the Division's no-
action response carefully expanded the scope of CREF I by al-
lowing offers and sales to U.S. citizens residing in France
under OPV privatization procedures.1 20 The response recog-
nized that the OPV procedures were the means of implement-
ing the denationalization,' 2 ' and that the French portions of
the offerings were not targeted at U.S. persons. 22
3. The CREF H Letter
The Division received yet a third no-action request, 23 the
second request on behalf of CREF ("CREF II"), asking for fur-
ther clarification of both the Act's registration requirements
and of the subtle technicalities of integration. In CREF 11,124
CREF asked the Division to agree that U.S. institutional inves-
tors could participate in "rights offerings"'' 25 by foreign issuers
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 77,436.
120. Id. Regarding this portion of the Division's response, an SEC source said,
"[i]t's not an interpretation that it's ok now to universally sell to U.S. citizens residing
abroad. It's just in this case, where you are dealing with conflicting law. When a
foreign Government mandates this kind of thing, we are taking a no-action position."
SEC Issues No-Action Letter to French Gov t, supra note 109, at 4.
121. French Privatization Program, supra note 20, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 78,439, at 77,436; see supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
122. French Privatization Program, supra note 20, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 78,439, at 77,436.
123. College Retirement Equities Fund 11, SEC No-Action Letter (June 4, 1987)
(available at Fordham International Law Journal office) (No-Action Letter Request avail-
able on LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) [hereinafter CREF II].
124. Id.
125. Id. at 3. Rights offerings are the offer of the privilege to buy additional
stock of the same kind. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1272 (5th ed. 1979). Rights are
traded in the market, and are valuable because the holder may buy such additional
stock at a price less than the market quotation. Id.; see also Wolfram & Bennet, Vul-
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without the necessity of foreign issuers taking special steps to*
avoid violation of U.S. securities laws. 12 6 Echoing CREF I,
CREF II expressed discontent with the uncertain application of
the Act's registration requirements, an uncertainty that pre-
vented CREF from realizing the full value of its foreign invest-
ments by rendering it unable to exercise its rights as securi-
tyholder.127  CREF's no-action request explicitly set out the
economic injuries it suffered, including costly recourse on the
secondary markets, as a result of these uncertainties. 28  CREF
argued that these uncertainties deprive U.S. institutions of
their rights as securityholders, and that such monetary loss "is
unnecessary as a matter of law and would be perverse as a mat-
ter of policy."1 2
9
CREF suggested that when a U.S. institutional investor
who qualifies as a section 4(2) sophisticated investor validly
holds foreign securities, and through a private placement sub-
sequently acquires either additional securities or securities or
rights through an exchange offer, the presence of the U.S. pri-
vate offering does not impose procedures on the concurrent
foreign public offering that would be required absent the U.S.
private offering.' 3 In addition, CREF stated that, assuming
the required nondistribution procedures were employed for
the foreign public offering, the offering would not be inte-
grated with, and therefore would not affect the Act's available
tinational Offerings: A United States Perspective After British Telecom, British Gas and British
Airways, 2 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 339, 353 (1987) (discussing rights offerings and ex-
change offers).
126. CREF II, supra note 123, at 3.
127. Id. at 2. CREF II included in these lost investment opportunities the exer-
cise of warrants or preemptive rights, the participation in dividend reinvestment
plans and in exchange offers by other foreign issuers, and the right to receive stock
dividends or meet payment calls on partly paid shares and thereby receive fully paid
shares. Id.
128. Id. In addition, the request noted that CREF suffered economic injury
when it was limited to receipt of cash in an offering to existing holders of a foreign
issuer's securities. Id. CREF stated that when it cannot exercise non-transferable
preemptive rights or tender payment on partly paid shares at the call, its foreign
securities or rights can, as a result, become worthless. Id.
129. Id. at 3.
130. Id.; see also Institutional Investors May Participate in Foreign Rights Offerings, Staff
Says, 19 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 932, 933 (June 19, 1987) [hereinafter Institutional
Investors May Participate] (discussing CREF II, supra note 123).
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exemptions for, the concurrent U.S. private offerings.'"' Fi-
nally, CREF asserted that no additional flowback procedures
would be required and that no integration should be found re-
gardless of whether securities of the foreign issuer are actually
traded in the United States.
132
In its response, the Division concurred with all of CREF's
opinions.133 First, the Division said that the concurrent offer-
ings would not be integrated, and that therefore any available
exemptions for the U.S. private offering would not be lost.
3 4
In addition, the Division noted that the simultaneous nature of
the offerings would not impose on the foreign public offerings
"any procedures in addition to those, if any, that would be re-
quired in the absence of the U.S. private offering."1 35
III. MODERNIZING THE SEC'S POLICIES ON
CONCURRENT MULTINA 770NAL OFFERINGS
The Division has issued several no-action letters to clarify
the Act's application to U.S. institutional investors wishing to
participate in concurrent domestic and foreign securities offer-
ings. However, the letters are more instructive in illustrating
the inadequacies of present methods than they are in provid-
ing the solutions because institutional investors continue to
suffer unnecessary economic losses and foreign issuers fear vi-
olating U.S. securities laws either by failing to register or by
unintentionally filing a faulty registration statement with the
SEC.
A. The SEC Must Implement A More Modernized Approach
1. Unnecessary Economic Injuries
In CREF II, CREF emphasized that it suffered lost invest-
ment opportunities and was left with the costly recourse of ac-
quisition on the secondary market as a result of the Act's un-
certainties.' 3 6 CREF suffered these losses because foreign is-
131. CREF 11, supra note 123, at 3; see also Institutional Investors May Participate,
supra note 130, at 933 (discussing CREF II, supra note 123).
132. CREF II, supra note 123, at 4; see also Institutional Investors May Participate.
supra note 130, at 933 (discussing CREF I1, supra note 123).
133. CREF II, supra note 123, Division's Response.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2.
612 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 11:592
suers often systematically exclude U.S. persons from such
offerings rather than risk violation of the Act.'" 7 CREF esti-
mates that these exclusionary practices deprived it of over ten
million dollars in investment benefits.' 38 Because the intent of
the U.S. securities laws is to protect U.S. investors, not to fos-
ter uncertainty or hamper investment opportunities, ' the
Act's requirements must be clearly delineated so that CREF
and other U.S. institutional investors "can enjoy the economic
rights to which they are entitled as investors in foreign capital
markets." 14 0
2. Foreign Issuers' Fear of the Unknown
Two significant obstacles impede foreign companies in
making registered U.S. offerings.4' The first is the Act's im-
position of liability for noncompliance with its provisions. For-
eign issuers fear that they will unintentionally file a faulty regis-
tration statement and will thus expose themselves to criminal
and civil liability. 142 Section 11 of the Act mandates that an
issuer is strictly liable for any damages incurred by any person
acquiring a security, if the registration statement contains un-
true statements of material facts or fails to state a required ma-
terial fact.143 Moreover, the Act provides that any person who
offers or sells a security in violation of section 5 or through a
137. Id.
138. Id. This estimate was made by CREF when CREF II was written in June
1987. Id.; see also Institutional Investors May Participate, supra note 130, at 933 (discuss-
ing CREF's loss of investment benefits). In addition, SEC rules and the uncertain
reach of U.S. securities laws have cost other U.S. institutional investors millions of
dollars, particularly in the context of rights offerings by British companies. Poor Stock
Settlement Systems Seen Hampering International Stock Trading, 19 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) 248, 250 (Feb. 20, 1987) [hereinafter Poor Stock Settlement Systems].
139. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, preamble, 48 Stat. 74, 74 (Act's purpose is
"[t]o provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in ... com-
merce and . . . to prevent frauds in the sale thereof"); see also Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (Act "was designed to provide investors with
full disclosure of material information concerning public offerings of securities ... to
protect investors against fraud and . . . to promote ethical standards of honesty and
fair dealing"). See generally Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29 (1959).
140. CREF II, supra note 123, at 3.
141. Poor Stock Settlements Systems, supra note 138, at 250.
142. Id.
143. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982). However, the issuer has one defense to section I I
strict liability: proving that the plaintiff knew of the "untruth or omission" at the
time he acquired the security. Securities Act § I 1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1982).
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prospectus or oral communication that contains "an untrue
statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements ... not misleading"
is liable to anyone purchasing from him for the consideration
paid for the security, plus interest.'4 4 Finally, in addition to
civil sanctions, anyone who willfully violates any of the Act's
provisions or any of the rules or regulations promulgated by
the SEC under the Act may be subject to fines, imprisonment,
or both.'4 5
The second barrier to U.S. registration by foreign issuers
is fear of the SEC,' 4 6 which can be characterized as fear of the
unknown. 14 7 Issuers fear that registration with the SEC will
force them to comply with additional requirements that may be
imposed by the SEC or Congress in the future. 14  This psy-
chological barrier is premised on resistance by foreign issuers
to U.S. legal concepts and on misinformation about the SEC's
policies. 4 ' In fact, before the French Government received
the Division's no-action response, France considered the SEC
unsupportive of its privatization program.' 51 In view of the
small initial U.S. investment in the privatization, the French
Government understandably blamed the SEC's complicated
rules for the seeming lack of U.S. interest. 15
B. Proposals for Facilitation of Multinational Offerings
The SEC recognizes the unprecedented degree to which
144. Securities Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
145. Securities Act § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1982).
146. Poor Stock Settlement Systems, supra note 138, at 250; see also SEC Convenes Inter-
nationalization Roundtable, THE SEC TODAY, Feb. 19, 1987, at 2 [hereinafter hiternatiol-
alization Roundtable] (discussing foreign issuers' fear of the SEC).
147. Nathan, Special Problems Arising as a Result of Trading in Multiple Markets. 4 J.
COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 1,9 (1982); Poor Stock Settlement Systems, supra note 138, at
250.
148. Poor Stock Settlement Systems, supra note 138, at 250. To alleviate this fear of
future regulations, commentators have suggested that foreign issuers who initially
complied with U.S. requirements should be allowed a subsequent grace period dur-
ing which to decide whether to extricate themselves from the system. Id. (citing sug-
gestion by D. Hawes at the SEC's Feb. 17, 1987, roundtable on internationalization
of securities markets); see also Internationalization Roundtable, supra note 146, at 2 (dis-
cussing foreign issuers' fears and suggesting methods to alleviate those fears).
149. Nathan, supra note 147, at 9.
150. French Courting, supra note 26.
151. Id.
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the world's security markets have become internationalized. '
2
However, it has yet to move beyond this preliminary recogni-
tion to address the issues raised by participation by U.S. insti-
tutional investors in global offerings. While proposals are reg-
ularly made to clarify the SEC's position at frequent discus-
sions on the internationalization of the securities markets,
53
none has been enacted. 54
1. Revisiting Release 4708 and Exploring a
More Territorial Approach
Large U.S. firms investing in international markets viewed
CREF I as a major development because, prior to its issuance,
it was unclear whether foreign governments could sell new
shares to U.S. institutional investors absent compliance with
the Act's registration requirements.155 As a result, U.S. invest-
ment firms had been precluded from participation in initial of-
ferings abroad, and thus were forced to seek recourse on the
costly international secondary markets. 56  Key SEC officials
152. On August 5, 1987, the SEC released its long-awaited report on interna-
tionalization of the securities markets: Report of the Staff of the L. S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs and the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce on the Internationalization of the Securities .Mlarkets.
The report is "a comprehensive study of internationalization issues, running over
900 pages." Internationalization Report Sent to Congress by SEC Staff, 19 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) 1187 (Aug. 7, 1987). SEC officials expect the report to be used in formu-
lating recommendations in the area of internationalization. Id. Congress directed
the SEC to prepare the comprehensive study on the internationalization of the
world's security markets. See S. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24 (1986);
H.R. REP. No. 155, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-8 (1985). On October 9, 1986, the SEC
provided Congress with an interim progress report discussing its recent significant
activities in the internationalization area. Report of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion to the House Committee on the Internationalization of the Securities Markets, SEC Interim
Progress Report, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,037
(Oct. 9, 1986).
153. For example, at the SEC roundtable, participants agreed that the Act cre-
ates an impediment to global market offerings. Internationalization Rondtable, supra
note 146, at 2. In addition, at the 1988 annual Securities Regulation Institute confer-
ence, Division Director Linda Quinn discussed the need for determining the proper
reach of section 5 of the Act to offshore transactions and to institutional investors.
Insider Trading Enforcement, Arbitration Takeover Issues Discussed at SRI Meeting, 20 SEc.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 143, 145 (Jan. 29, 1988) [hereinafter Insider Trading Enforce-
ment].
154. See ifra notes 155-191 and accompanying text.
155. Stamas, supra note 87, at 1.
156. Id.; see also CREF I, supra note 19, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 78,420, at 77,362 ("Uncertainties surrounding the application of the 1933
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viewed CREF I as the first significant step towards modernizing
the concepts implicit in Release 4708 because the letter gives
guidance on the appropriate circumstances for permitting U.S.
participation in foreign offerings.
15 7
After the Division issued CREF I, SEC sources said that
the Commission was planning a "major overhaul" of Release
4708. 158 Such revision of the Release is essential because it
remains the last comprehensive expression of SEC policy on
the reach of the Act's registration requirements to interna-
tional transactions. 1' In 1964, when the Division issued Re-
lease 4708, few U.S. investors were interested in transactions
abroad.' 6 ° Today, however, U.S. investors often rely on for-
eign investments to diversify their portfolios.'"
Accordingly, the SEC must modernize Release 4708 to ad-
dress integration of contemporaneous multinational offerings
and the scope of section 5 in today's globalized markets. The
Division recognizes that establishing the proper reach of sec-
tion 5 is critical, and thus plans to restructure Release 4708
into a "safe harbor" rule. 162 Under this safe harbor approach,
the focus would be on the location of the offering or sale of the
securities, rather than on the purchaser's identity as set forth
in Release 4708.163 The safe harbor rule proposes that an is-
Act to the French privatizations have hampered CREF's ability to participate in the
first two offerings . . . making recourse to the secondary market costly to CREF.").
157. Stamas, supra note 87, at 1. Division Director Linda Quinn said that
"[t]here's been considerable urging of the Commission to revisit Release 4708 and to
modernize its concepts and to give more guidance. This letter represents a step in
that direction." Id.
158. SEC Asked To Clarify, supra note 108, at 3.
159. Insider Trading Enforcement, supra note 153, at 145 (Division Director Linda
Quinn commented that Release 4708 is the "last and most definitive word to date on
the application of § 5 to offshore offerings.").
160. In 1976, Congress repealed legislation that imposed a 15% tax on the
purchase of foreign securities, and thereby facilitated dealings by U.S. investors in
such securities. Tax Reform Act of 1976 § 1307(b), Pub. L. No. 94-455, sec. 1307(b),
§ 4911, 90 Stat. 1520, 1723-26 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 4911 (1982)),
repealng the Interest Equalization Tax Act § 2(a), Pub. L. No. 88-563, sec. 2(a),
§ 4911, 78 Stat. 809, 809-10 (1964).
161. Revzin, French Denationalization Lures U.S. Firns, Wall St.J., Oct. 24, 1986, at
32, col. 3; see also Sebit, U.S. Institutions Find Buying Foreign Stocks Can Be IVev Profitable.
Wall St. J., June 3, 1986, at 1, col. 6 ("Foreign stocks are in vogue among U.S....
money managers.").
162. ALI-ABA Panel Discusses Insider Trading Developments, 20 SEc. REG. & L. REI.
(BNA) 132, 134 (Jan. 29, 1988) [hereinafter ALl-ABA Panel].
163. Id.
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suer would not have to take precautions to prevent flowback if
its unregistered securities were sold offshore.'1 4 This proposal
is premised on the condition that the issuer is a reporting com-
pany and is not conducting its offshore offerings solely to avoid
SEC requirements.'" 5 However, there is a problem inherent in
this seemingly simple approach. Because many complex trans-
actions occur in electronic markets, focusing on the location of
the offering and determining where the sale takes place could
be difficult. 16"
Nevertheless, the safe-harbor approach correctly confines
U.S. securities laws to domestic markets. Large U.S. institu-
tional investors would benefit immensely by this more territo-
rial standard, which would enable them to buy foreign securi-
ties in initial offshore offerings without implicating the Act's
uncertain registration requirements.
2. New Exchanges: Creation of "Onshore-Offshore" Markets
In addressing the need for modernization of Release
4708, SEC officials have suggested that the purpose behind the
Act's registration requirements is obviated when the offerings
and sales of the securities are made to institutional, profes-
sional investors. 167 Such investors do not require the protec-
tion of the registration process. 6  Accordingly, two U.S. stock
markets-the National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD") and the American Stock Exchange ("AMEX")-
have proposed creating new "onshore-offshore" markets
where sophisticated investors can buy non-U.S.-registered se-
curities of foreign companies. 6'W) Three main factors precipi-
164. SEC Staff to Work on Developing Safe Harbor Rule for Foreign Offerings, 19 SEc.
REG. & L. RE'. (BNA) 1444, 1445 (Sept. 25, 1987).
165. Id.
166. Id.; ALI-ABA Panel, snpra note 162, at 134.
167. Poor Stock Settlement Systems, sipra note 138, at 250. At the SEC roundtable,
Division Director Linda Quinn said, "sales of securities to institutional, professional
investors could explicitly be recognized as outside the necessary protections of the
Securities Act and thus be permitted, either in direct sales from an issuer, or upon
resale, to proceed without Section 5 implications." Id.
168. Id.
169. Two Exchaiges Close to Snbiitting New Market Proposals, Grtmdfest Says, 19 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1519, 1520 (Oct. 9, 1987) [hereinafter Two Exchlges Close to
Subiitting]; see also Insider Trading, Interiationalization, Rule *144.4" Discussed at B.4 Con-
ference, 19 SEC. REG. & I.. RE'. (BNA) 1242, 1244-45 (Aug. 14. 1987) [hereinafter
iisider Tradiiig] (discussing new exchange idea).
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tated the proposals: (1) the increase in the desire of U.S. in-
vestors to invest in foreign equity securities; (2) the desire of
foreign issuers to expand their markets; and (3) the obstacles
presented by the SEC's registration process that inhibit issuers
from gaining access to U.S. capital markets.')1
Both proposals demonstrate concerted efforts to remove
the impediments placed on U.S. institutional investors by the
Act's uncertain application. Each of the proposed onshore-off-
shore markets would facilitate the trend towards international-
ization in two important ways. First, by providing a forum in
which sophisticated U.S. institutional investors have the op-
portunity to trade unregistered foreign securities, the pro-
posed markets address the needs of today's capital markets.''
The idea of creating such markets properly recognizes that if
sophisticated U.S. investors will go abroad to buy foreign se-
curities with the best risk-adjusted return, the transactions
might as well occur in a domestic market where there are
greater assurances that the counterparty will pay. 172 Second,
the proposed exchange solution will serve to "institutionaliz[e]
the private placement process"' 17 3 so that foreign issuers will
have access to the U.S. institutional market without the con-
comitant uncertainties arising from the Act's registration pro-
visions. 174
On December 23, 1987, AMEX filed a proposed rule
change with the SEC seeking the Commission's approval of a
170. Insider Trading, supra note 169, at 1245.
171. See Insider Trading Enforcement, supra note 153, at 145 ("The proposal is the
latest step in an effort that has been going on for some time-in the form of complex
private placements and relief through no-action letters-to give foreign issuers ac-
cess to U.S. markets without being forced to comply with ... requirements imposed
by '33 Act registration.").
172. Two Exchanges Close to Subintting, supra note 169, at 1520. As one legal com-
mentator noted, "The issue is not whether U.S. investors will purchase foreign securi-
ties, but where they will purchase such securities." Thomas, Internationalization of the
Worlds Capital Varkets: Ca the S.E.C. Help Shape the Future?, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'I. L. &
Poi.. 55, 58 (1982) (emphasis in original).
173. Insider Trading, supra note 169, at 1245 (ctig Richard Scribner, executive
vice-president of AMEX). "Institutionalization" refers to the pooling of savings
through large institutions and the high-volume, block securities transactions man-
aged bv these entities. Thus, these institutional funds are replacing the individual
investor by acting as intermediaries and actually purchasing the securities from the
issuer. Gruson, The Glohal Sentrities .Market: Introductory Remarks, 2 Coi.trt. Bus. ..
REv. 303, 305 (1987).
174. Iisider Trading, sipra note 169, at 1245.
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new domestic market for institutional trading of unregistered
securities. 7  The proposed "System for Institutional Trading
of Unregistered Securities" ("SITUS") would attract U.S. insti-
tutional investors currently trading in foreign markets. The
system allows such investors to purchase and resell unregis-
tered securities of foreign issuers "without the need for the
traditional procedures . . .used in current U.S. private place-
ments of such securities." 176
SITUS would be operated as a division of AMEX, and
would be used for trading debt and equity securities of quali-
fied foreign private issuers and debt securities of qualified for-
eign government issuers. 177 These approved securities could
be traded only with eligible institutions that meet the accred-
ited investor requirements of Regulation D. 178 Thus, access to
SITUS would be limited to those who do not need the Act's
protection. 179 In addition, AMEX's proposal would allow insti-
tutions purchasing unregistered securities through SITUS to
resell those securities only on foreign exchanges, to foreign
dealers, and to non-U.S. persons purchasing abroad. 8 °
The proposal recognizes that private placements of for-
eign securities in the United States would increase if institu-
tional investors could efficiently resell the securities.' AMEX
officials noted that current procedures require "customary, but
cumbersome safeguards" that hinder institutions' ability to re-
sell "without significantly improving the SEC's ability to moni-
tor compliance with the law."' 812 Although SITUS offers an al-
ternative that would facilitate such securities transactions, it is
unclear whether the SEC will adopt AMEX's proposal."'M
175. .AIEX Proposal lould Create Warket for Institutional Foreign Stock Trading, 20
SEC. REG. & L. REI. (BNA) 6 (Jan. 8, 1988) [hereinafter .4MEX Proposal].
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 1i.; see also notes 51-62 and accompanying text. In addition, the Commis-
sion has adopted several amendments to Regulation D that expand the definition of
"accredited investor." Regulation D Revisions, SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-
6758, 53 Fed. Reg. 7866, 7866-67 (Mar. 3, 1988); see 53 Fed. Reg. at 7868-69 (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.215, 230.501-.504).
179. .tIIEX Proposal, supra note 175, at 6; se supra text accompanying notes 167-
168.
180. .I.iIEX Proposal, supra note 175, at 6.
181. 1d. at 7.
182. Id.
183. Remarks of Edward Greene at the annual Securities Regulation Institute
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Thus, foreign issuers and U.S. institutional investors alike
must continue to attempt to comply with the Act's uncertain
requirements while they wait for the SEC to adopt a new ap-
proach.
3. Rule 144A and the Free-Trade Zone Policy
CREF officials viewed CREF I as a step towards the crea-
tion of a so-called free-trade zone policy for U.S. institutional
investors. 1 4 The policy, which SEC officials also refer to as
Rule 144A,' 85 is based on exempting offers and sales to institu-
tional investors from the Act's registration and reporting re-
quirements. 18 6 In addition, the suggested rule would allow for
less restrictive resales of the securities by those investors. 187
Although the SEC staff has not yet issued a rule proposal
for public comment, the mere suggestion of this exemption is
another manifestation of the SEC's growing acceptance of the
notion that sophisticated institutional investors can participate
in international transactions without the Act's protections.
Such a rule accurately assesses the distinction between institu-
tional investors and individual, nonprofessional investors in
the retail markets by recognizing that the Act was designed to
protect nonprofessional investors.
Rule 144A is designed to codify, in part, the "section 4(1-
1/2) exemption," which provides methods to resell securities
that are issued initially in a private placement without registra-
tion under the Act.' 88 In addition, SEC officials expect the rule
proposal to be issued with two alternatives. '" Essentially, the
first alternative would provide that any Regulation D-qualified
institutional investor could be a buyer, but that there would be
a limit on the securities that could be resold. t " The second
conference (Jan. 20-22, 1988), snmmarized n Insider Trading Enforcemewt, supra note 153,
at 145.
184. Stamas, sura note 87, at 1.
185. linider Tadng, supra note 169, at 1245.
186. Poor Stock Settlement SYstems, supra note 138, at 249.
187. Id.
188. hIsider Trading, supra note 169, at 1245.
189. .L1-..IB.. Panel, supra note 162, at 135; Inider Tading, supra note 169, at
1245.
190. .- L.-AB4 Panel, supra note 162, at 135. The limitation would be to senior
investment-grade debt securities of companies that have been reporting companies
for at least three years. Id.
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alternative would limit the buyers by size, thus enabling only
large institutions to qualify for the exemption."'"
CONCLUSION
The SEC has received several proposals that would clarify
application of the Securities Act of 1933 to multinational offer-
ings, and would thus facilitate participation by U.S. institu-
tional investors in such offerings. The proposals correctly rec-
ognize that, as sophisticated investors, institutional investors
do not require the protection of the Act's registration require-
ments. However, until the SEC adopts such a proposal, U.S.
institutional investors' ability to purchase securities of foreign
issuers will continue to be hindered by the Act's uncertain ap-
plication. Only when the SEC implements a proposal that fa-
cilitates participation by institutional investors in multinational
offerings will U.S. institutional investors be able to recognize
fully the myriad investment opportunities offered by today's
international securities markets.
Jodi E. Freid *
191. Isider Trading, supra note 169, at 1245-46. Although "large institutions"
has not been defined, Division Director Linda Quinn indicated the possibility of
"something that would roughly parallel the same type of institutions that would fall
in the 13-F area." Id. This alternative will probably have a condition that one of the
security's terms entitles the holder of the security to the issuer's disclosure informa-
tion if the issuer had produced such information to comply with the requirements of
his home exchange. Id.; ALI-ABA Panel, supra note 162, at 135.
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